We test whether professional forecasters forecast rationally or behaviorally using a unique database, QSS Database, which is the monthly panel of forecasts on Japanese stock prices and bond yields. The estimation results show that (i) professional forecasts are behavioral, namely, significantly influenced by past forecasts, (ii) there exists a stock-bond dissonance: while forecasting behavior in the stock market seems to be herding, that in the bond market seems to be bold in the sense that their current forecasts tend to be negatively related to past forecasts, and (iii) the dissonance is due, at least partially, to the individual forecasters' behavior that is influenced by their own past forecasts rather than others. Even in the same country, forecasting behavior is quite different by market.
Introduction
In this paper, we test whether professional forecasters forecast rationally or behaviorally using a unique database, QSS database. This survey includes forecasts on both stock prices and bond yields for various time horizons. The history of forecasts made by a particular individual forecaster can be also tracked.
Testing rationality of decision-making, including forecasting, is not a new subject. There have been a vast and growing number of studies from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. The seminal study by Tversky and Kahneman (1974) shows the possibility that decision-making is not perfectly rational and rather heuristic. Decision makers tend to use a simple rule such as anchoring, where the decision is based on some uninformative targets.
1 In particular, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) report that answers to such a simple but unfamiliar question as "how many countries in Africa are the member of the United Nations"can be heavily in ‡uenced by the number suggested by the Wheel of Fortune. Kahneman and Knetsch (1993) and Wansink, Kent, and Hoch (1998) also show similar results on di¤erent economic activities. Beggs and Graddy (2009) 
…nd anchoring e¤ects in art auctions.
Herding is a closely related concept. 2 According to Banerjee (1992) , herding is de…ned as the behavior that"people will be doing what others are doing rather than using their information." Some economic activities, such as fertility decisions and voting, are heavily in ‡uenced by what other people are doing. Banerjee (1992) and Zhang (1997) point out that the strong complementarity on each decision making and asymmetric information could lead to herding behavior. As for the former, if some things are worthwhile when others are doing related things, network externalities can result in herding. On the latter, economic agents may think that other people should possess more valuable information.
Many studies herding behavior in the …nancial markets, particularly forecasting behavior taken by analysts or professional forecasters. Bondt and Forbes (1999) de…ne excessive agreement among analyst predictions, that is, a surprising degree of consensus relative to the predictability of corporate earning. Ehrbeck and Waldmann (1996) raise the possibility of rational cheating, a tendency to mimic able forecasters. Cooper, Day, and Lewis (2001) empirically support this rational cheating using analysts' performances, and Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1995) , Graham (1999), and Welch (2000) also report similar results for mutual fund managers. Park and Sabourian (2011) investigate the relationship between herding and contrarian behavior. Ichiue and Yuyama (2009) …nd irrationality of professional forecasts for the Fed Funds futures market. We revisit this problem with a new and unique database.
Estimation results in this paper show that (i) professional forecasts are behavioral, namely, signi…cantly in ‡uenced by past forecasts, (ii) there exists a stock-bond dissonance: while forecasting behavior in the stock market seems to be herding, that in the bond market seems to be bold in the sense that their current forecasts tend to be negatively related to past forecasts, and (iii) the dissonance is due at least partially to the individual forecasters' behavior that is in ‡uenced by their own past forecasts rather than others'. We also show that contrary to the previous studies such as Hong, Kubik, and Solomon (2000) and Lamont (2002) , the degree of such behavioral forecasting as herding or bold in the Japanese …nancial markets has little to do with individual experiences as professional forecasters.
These are new results and altogether imply a complex forecasting behavior in the Japanese …nancial markets. Even in the same country, forecasting behavior is quite di¤erent by market. This suggests that the nature of professionals in the stock market is fundamentally di¤erent from that in the bond market.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 shows the details of the data used in this paper and estimation strategy. Then, we report estimation results in Section 3. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
Estimation 2.1 The QSS Data
The QSS monthly conducts the paper-based surveys of forecasts as well as attitudes made by professional forecasters in the Japanese …nancial markets. This survey includes forecasts on both stock prices and bond yields for various time horizons. We use forecasts on the stock prices (TOPIX) and newlyissued JGB yields (5-year, 10-year and 20-year maturities) for the one-, three-, and six-month horizons. Each respondent is asked to answer a point forecast for each horizon. Surveys are collected from securities …rms, asset managements, investment advisers, banks, trust banks, life insurances, general insurances, and pension funds. On average, we have 150 forecasts each month. We can also track the history of forecasts made by a particular individual forecaster.
The 
Estimation Strategy
Do professional forecasters determine their own forecasts rationally or behaviorally relying on past forecasts? We …rst evaluate this question only using macro aggregated data. We then test how individual forecasts are in ‡uenced by their own past forecasts or publicly available past mean forecasts. In this paper, S t!t+n denotes a survey forecast conducted in period t of the stock price or bond yields in period t + n, and K t+n denotes ex post realized value in period t + n. Since we have a panel data set, we have two de…nitions of survey forecasts. The …rst is what we call the aggregate mean forecast S and the second is the individual forecastS. E t denotes the expectation operator under rational expectations.
Following Ichiue and Yuyama (2009), we consider a partial adjustment model of survey forecasts:
where measures the degree of the inertia in survey forecasts. Naturally, if = 0, the current survey forecasts S t!t+n are equal to the rational expectations conditional on the information available in period t, namely E t K t+n . 6 = 0 implies that current survey forecasts are in ‡uenced by previous surveys. By using the de…nition of the forecast error, equation (1) can be transformed into
where = 1 ;
t!t+n denotes the forecast error, which is not predictable from information known in period t under rational expectations. As a result, we can test a null hypothesis of = 0, that implies rational forecasts, by estimating equation (2).
3 When 6 = 0, forecasts are behavioral. Especially when > 0, forecasts are pulled by past forecasts and therefore are considered herding. When < 0, the current forecast tends to be revised more widely than the changes in the rational expectations, and toward opposite directions from past forecasts. According to the terminology de…ned in Clement and Tse (2005) , such forecasting behavior is called bold. When testing rationality of forecasts, we examine three cases depending on the de…nition of survey forecasts: (Case A) aggregate mean forecasts on aggregate past mean forecasts, namely S on S; (Case B) individual forecasts on aggregate past mean forecasts, namelyS on S; (Case C) individual forecasts on individual past forecasts namelyS onS. Regarding the combinations of (n; k), we examine three cases: (n; k) = (1; 2), (3; 3) or (1; 5).
We also evaluate the di¤erences by professional experience for (Case B) and (Case C). We divide forecasts into three categories: (1) less than 1 year, (2) between 1 and 2 years of experiences, and (3) more than 2 years of experience. Since mean for each category (1), (2) and (3) is not publicly available, we always use S as reference forecasts. Table 1 shows the estimation results in (Case A), namely and = 1+ from K t+n S t!t+n = ( S t!t+n S t k!t+n ) + t!t+n :
All and are positive and signi…cant in forecasts on stock prices. 5 As have been reported in such previous studies as Ehrbeck and Waldmann (1996) , forecasts on stock prices are judged behavioral and herding. On the other hand, all coe¢ cients are not signi…cant in forecasts on bond yields. This is not inconsistent with rational forecasting in the bond market. Below, we will check this rational or behavioral forecasts in both markets using individual forecasts. (1,5) -0.090** -0.098 Note: * and ** denote signi…cance at 5% and 1% level respectively. from K t+n S t!t+n = (S t!t+n S t k!t+n ) + t!t+n :
Individual Data 3.2.1 Reliance on Aggregate Mean Forecast (Case B)
Even when forecasting behavior is evaluated with micro individual forecasts, we can still …nd herding behavior in forecasts on stock prices. 6 On the other hand, regarding forecasts on bond yields, all and are signi…cantly negative. According to the results here, forecasting behavior in the bond market is considered bold. Professional forecasters have a tendency to revise their forecasts rather boldly to the opposite directions from the previous consensus.
7
Results so far exhibit a stock-bond dissonance: while forecasting behavior in the stock market is considered herding, individual forecasters in the bond market are characterized bold. These results are new and altogether imply very complex forecasting behavior in the Japanese …nancial markets. For the QSS, many respondents do not report for both stock and bond markets. Due possibly to such market segmentation, forecasting behavior is quite di¤erent by market even in the same country.
Reliance on Individual Forecast (Case C)
We seek for the reason behind the stock-bond dissonance by looking into the individual forecasting behavior, namely estimating how individual forecasts are related to their own past forecasts. Table 3 shows the estimation results in (Case C), namely and = 1+ from
Forecasts in the stock market are sticky, namely having a tendency to follow their past individual forecasts. On the other hand, those in the bond market are considered to have excess sensitivity to new available information. Consequently, forecasts tend to be revised drastically and quite often to the opposite directions from their own previous forecasts. These results altogether show that the stock-bond dissonance is due, at least partially, to the di¤erence in the individual forecasting behavior between the stock and the bond markets: sticky forecasts in the stock market and excess sensitivity in forecasts in the bond market. 
Di¤erences by Experience
Hong, Kubik, and Solomon (2000) conclude that experienced forecasters are more likely to provide bold forecasts than inexperienced forecasters. Lamont (2002) also …nds that with the more experiences, forecasts become more radical. We test whether forecasting behavior in the Japanese …nancial markets di¤ers by experience. Table 4 and 5 show the estimation results for (Case B) in equation (3) and (Case C) in equation (4) respectively by experience. We cannot observe any clear di¤erence by experience. Forecasting behavior in the Japanese …nancial market is characterized by market and not by experience.
Conclusion
In this paper, we …nd that (i) professional forecasts are behavioral and significantly in ‡uenced by past forecasts, and (ii) there exists a stock-bond dissonance: while forecasting behavior in the stock market is considered herding, individual forecasters in the bond market are characterized bold in a sense that their current forecasts are negatively related to past forecasts. Forecasting behavior in the …nancial markets is not unique and di¤erent by market. Furthermore, the degree of such behavioral forecasting is not in ‡uenced by experience as professional forecasters.
We have shown that this dissonance stems, at least partially, from the (1,5) -0.062* -0.066 -0.039** -0.041 -0.047** -0.049 Note: * and ** denote signi…cance at 5% and 1% level respectively. di¤erence in the individual forecasting behavior between the stock and the bond markets: sticky forecasts in the stock market and excess sensitivity in forecasts in the bond market. Yet, we have not investigated the structural reason behind this dissonance. This requires a microeconomic modelling of professional forecasters. Structural understanding of this dissonance is left for our future research.
